Florida Law Review
Volume 25

Issue 3

Article 3

March 1973

The Rights of the Mentally Ill During Incarceration: The Developing
Law
Patrick C. Rastatter

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Patrick C. Rastatter, The Rights of the Mentally Ill During Incarceration: The Developing Law, 25 Fla. L. Rev.
494 (1973).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss3/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Rastatter: The Rights of the Mentally Ill During Incarceration: The Developi
NOTES

THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL DURING INCARCERATION: THE DEVELOPING LAW*
Judicial and legislative concern for the rights of the mentally ill has historically been confined to the commitment process.1 As a result, the incarcerated mentally ill have been faced with antiquated facilities, deficient
treatment, and a system that deprives them of liberties the average citizen
takes for granted. 2 The reasons for this injustice are manifest. Legislators
and judges, untrained in the fields of psychiatry and psychotherapy, have
deemed it necessary to yield to mental health experts by allowing them
3
arbitrary control over mental patients once they are lawfully committed.
This acquiescence has been perpetuated by the relatively few actions brought
by incarcerated patients to enforce their rights.4 Normally the patient is
ignorant of his statutory and constitutional rights and unaware of the availability of judicial recourse. Even if the patient does seek redress of his rights,
his attempt may be frustrated by restrictions on communication imposed by
the incarcerating institution. 6 Consequently, limitations on the patient's liberty have been determined by an elitist group, qualified by their own ex7
pertise, but functioning with almost complete autonomy.
During the past decade a rising legislative and judicial awareness of the
conditions present in mental institutions has focused attention on the rights
of incarcerated mental patients.s In 1961 the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the United States Senate conducted hearings on the constitutional
rights of the mentally ill. 9 The report of the subcommittee included a Draft
*F
TOR's NOTE:
This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize
for the best student note submitted in the fall 1972 quarter.
1. Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I,
at 330 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
2. See T. SzAsz, LAw, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963); Note, Compulsory Commitment: The Rights of the Incarcerated Mentally Ill, 1969 DUKE LJ. 677. For a discussion
of the inadequacies of mental institutions in this country, see Solomon, The American
PsychiatricAssociation in Relation to American Psychiatry, 115 AM. J. PsYcHiATRY 1 (1958).
3. See Comment, The Committed Mentally Ill and Their Right To Communicate,
7 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 297 (1971). For a discussion of the theories underlying involuntary
commitment statutes see Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and
Policy, 57 MICH. L. REv. 945 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Ross]; Siegel, The Justifications
for Medical Commitment -Real or Illusory, 6 WAKE FOST INTRA. L. REv. 21 (1969).
4. Note, supra note 2, at 699.
5. id.
6. Id. at 700. See text accompanying notes 116-69 infra.
7. Comment, supra note 3, at 297.
8. See Note, supra note 2, at 700. For a collection of the various state statutes governing the rights of the mentally ill after commitment see F. LINDMAN & D. McIN'YRE, THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 174-88 (rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as F. LINDMAN

& D. MCINTYRE].

9.

Hearings,supra note 1.
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Act, which contained a provision guaranteeing certain rights to the mental
patient after commitment. 0 Comparable codifications of patient rights have
now been adopted by several states,:" including Florida with its recently enacted Baker Act.'

2

Although such statutory enactment of patient rights may appear objectionable as impinging upon the executive authority over the hospital, it has
been observed that it does not interfere with orderly administration, and it
generally reflects the standard of care in better operated hospitals.' 3 The
guarantees of the various acts mirror only those rights that are necessarily
implied from the function of any mental institution.This note will examine the statutory and constitutional rights of incarcerated mental patients, focusing on the right to treatment, the right not to
be treated, the right to communicate, the right to privacy, and the right to
challenge administrative decisions. Additionally, the note will evaluate the
guarantees provided by Florida's Baker Act, recommending improvements
including a statute to safeguard the mental patient's right to communicate.
THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT

Most of the care received in state mental institutions is merely custodial.:"
The majority of these institutions are woefully overcrowded and the situation
is compounded by a severe and continuing personnel shortage.16 These conditions have resulted in the least trained member of the staff, the non-medical
ward attendant, having the greatest control over care and treatment of
incarcerated patients.'Y This situation is highly undesirable because the
incarceration of a mental patient without adequate medical treatment will
result in the worsening of his mental illness.' 8
These various factors have resulted in the emergence of a "right to treatment" for incarcerated mental patients. 9 Such a concept was initially formu-

10. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, A DRAFT Acr
GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL §§19-26 (Public Health Service Publication No. 51, rev. 1952) [hereinafter cited as DRAFT Acr].
11. E.g., CAL. WEIF. 8: INST'NS CODE §5325 (West 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. §253A.17

(1971).
12. FLA. STAT. §§394.451-.477 (1971). The Act, also known as "The Florida Mental Health
Act," became effective July 1, 1972.
13. Ross, supra note 3, at 979.
14. See DRAFT Acr, supra note 10, pt. 4 commentary.
15. Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J.
87, 88 (1967). See Bassiouni, The Right of the Mentally Ill to Cure and Treatment: Medical
Due Process, 15 DEPAUL L. REv. 291 (1966).
16. Hearings,supra note 1, at 339; Note, supra note 15, at 88.
17. See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 500 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Birnbaum].
18. Note, supra note 2, at 715-16. See Note, Analysis of Legal and Medical Considerations in Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 56 YALE L.J. 1178 (1947). See generally E.
GOFFMAN, AsYLuMs (1961).
19. The literature discussing the right to treatment is immense. See articles in Symposium - The Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 742 (1969); A Symposium - The
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lated by Morton Birnbaum who defined the problem of inadequate medical
treatment for the incarcerated mentally ill as essentially a legal, rather than
a medical problem. 20 Dr. Birnbaum's concept of a patient's constitutional
right to receive adequate medical care received its major judicial impetus
in the landmark case of Rouse v. Cameron,2 1 decided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Rouse had been summarily committed to a mental institution following a determination that he
was not guilty by reason of insanity on a misdemeanor charge.2 2 In a habeas
corpus petition filed in the district court, Rouse alleged he was receiving no
psychiatric treatment at the institution. The appellate court reversed the
lower court's dismissal of the writ on statutory grounds,2 but suggested that
the right to treatment might be constitutionally guaranteed in the absence
of a statute.24 Judge Bazelon indicated that a failure to provide treatment
raises constitutional questions of due process, equal protection, and cruel
25
and unusual punishment.
20
While Rouse was held to have a statutorily provided right to treatment,
subsequent decisions in other jurisdictions have been more constitutionally
oriented. In Wyatt v. Stickney,-2 for example, the District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama ruled that when mental patients are committed
involuntarily through noncriminal proceedings without the constitutional
protections that are afforded criminal defendants "they unquestionably have
a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give each
of them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental

Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 673 (1969).
20. Birnbaum, supra note 17, at 503.
21. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
22. "Ifany person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense, or tried
in the juvenile court of the District of Columbia for an offense, is acquitted solely on
the ground that he was insane at the time of its commission, the court shall order such
person to be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill." D.C. CODE ANN. §24-301 (d)
(1961). Summary commitment statutes have recently come under constitutional attack. See,
e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966);
Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Cameron v. Mullen, 387 F.2d 193 (D.C.
Cir. 1967).
23. 373 F.2d at 455. The court relied on D.C. CODE §21-562 (Supp. V, 1966), which
provides that a person hospitalized in a public hospital for a mental illness shall, during
his hospitalization, be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and treatment.
24. 373 F.2d at 453.
25. Id. For a discussion of the constitutional arguments in favor of a right to treatment
suggested in Rouse, see Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134, 113747 (1967); Note, supra note 15, at 97-104.
26. For subsequent right to treatment cases in the District of Columbia, see In re
Curry, 452 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104
(D.C. Cir. 1967); Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
27. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). For a discussion of this case by the associate
counsel for the plaintiffs, see Drake, Enforcing the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney,
10 Ams. CauM. L. REv. 587 (1972).
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condition." 2s1 Adequate and effective treatment is constitutionally mandated,
the court reasoned, because, absent treatment, the hospital is transformed
"into a penitentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no convicted
offense." 29 The court noted: "To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty
upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic
reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process."3 0 Constitutional interpretation has spawned similar
results in other jurisdictions. 3
New York courts have recognized the right to treatment to a considerable
degree while rejecting the argument that treatment is constitutionally required. In People ex rel. Anonymous v. La Burt, 32 for example, the court
stated it was the policy of the state to care for and protect mentally ill persons
and, if possible, to cure them of disease. 33 However, the court added that this
policy does not confer on the patient a right to release in the event of claimed
inadequate treatment.3 4 Statutory guarantees of a right to treatment for committed mental patients, as found in the District of Columbia35 and recommended by the Draft Act,36 have now been enacted in several states 3 7 including Florida.38
The development of an enforceable right to treatment has drawn considerable criticism due to the difficulty in establishing a standard of treatment.3 9
Opponents point out that because of the vast array of therapeutic techniques,
methods of treatment must vary among patients as well as among institutions.40 Furthermore, the critics argue that courts do not possess the medical
competence to choose among the varieties of treatment and formulate for

28. 325 F. Supp. at 784.
29.

Id.

S0. Id. at 785.
31. See United States v. Walker, 335 F. Supp. 705 (N.D. Cal. 1971); United States
v. Jackson, 306 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State
Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968). See also Maatallah v. Warden, Nevada State
Prison, 470 P.2d 122 (Nev. 1970); Application of D.D., 285 A.2d 283 (Super. Ct. of N.J.
1971).
32. 14 App. Div. 2d 560, 218 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1961); see Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693,
290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
33. 14 App. Div. 2d at 560, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
34. Id.

35. D.C. CODE §21-562 (Supp. V, 1966).
36. DRr AcTr, supra note 10, §19.
37. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 , §12-1 (Supp. 1969).
38. FLA. STAT. §394A59 (2) (1971).
39. The problem becomes even more apparent when considering that some doctors
believe that punishment itself is treatment for certain anti-social individuals. A second assertion is that simple custody of the mental patient, away from society and its stresses, is
treatment. Another school of thought, known as "environmental or mileau therapy," entails
a recognition that the hospital social structure can serve as a force in rehabilitating the
mentally ill. See Note, supra note 15, at 106-07. Any of these theories, if carried to their
extreme, could render a constitutional right to treatment meaningless.
40. See, e.g., Council of the American Psychiatric Ass'n, Position Statement on the
Question of Adequacy of Treatment, 123 Ams. J. PsYcHIArTRY 1458 (1967).
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themselves a standard of adequate treatment.41 Judge Bazelon, however, believes that "such diffidence in the face of scientific expertise is conduct unbecoming a court." 42 He maintains that the courts should be assisted in their
quest to protect the patient's right to treatment through the development
of legislative and administrative standards of treatment. 43 Florida has moved
in this direction with the enactment of a quality of treatment provision to
44
supplement its statutory right to treatment.
In discussing the formulation of a standard of care, proponents of the
right-to-treatment concept have differed among themselves. Some writers
believe the standard should be "objectively based upon a consideration of
the institution as a whole" rather than subjectively premised upon the individual treatment received. 45 Other commentators deem this approach to be
ill-advised, since an institution that meets certain minimum standards
"might not be treating a particular mental patient in a manner appropriate
to his needs and, indeed, might be totally lacking in the treatment resources
needed by him."

46

It was with this consideration in mind that Judge Bazelon in Rouse
stated that the treatment afforded must be suited to the needs of the particular patient in light of present medical knowledge. 47 The application of this
standard was subsequently clarified by the court in Tribby v. Cameron.48
There, the court remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether
the plaintiff was receiving adequate treatment with the proviso that the trial
court was not to decide what treatment the patient required but only whether
the hospital had made a permissible and reasonable decision on treatment
within a broad range of discretion. The court pointed out that its function
in reviewing adequacy of treatment cases resembles that of reviewing agency
action. As such, the court does not decide whether the agency has made the
best decision, but only whether it has made a "permissible and reasonable
decision in view of the relevant information and within a broad range of
discretion."49

41.

See Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d 519, 523-24 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J., con-

curring).
42. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHi. L. REv. 742, 743 (1969).
43. Id. at 745-48.
44. FLA. STAT. §394.459(3) (1971) provides in part: "Each patient in a facility shall
receive treatment suited to his needs, which shall be administered skillfully, safely, and
humanely with full respect for his dignity and personal integrity. Each patient shall receive
such medical, vocational, social, educational, and rehabilitative services as his condition
requires."
45. Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEo. L.J. 752, 753 (1969). Cf. Director
of Patauxent Institution v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 940

(1966).
46. Halpern, A PracticingLawyer Views the Right to Treatment, 57 Gao. L.J. 782, 792

(1969).
47. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Florida requires that the
treatment afforded be suited to the needs of the particular patient. See note 44 supra.
48. 379 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
49. ld. at 105.
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted this "substantial
evidence" standard of review in Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State
Hospital.50 The institution in which Nason was confined was so understaffed
that it was unable to provide its patients with suitable treatment. Nason's
treatment consisted of "custodial care; three meals a day and a bed."5 The
court indicated that if adequate treatment were not afforded Nason within
a reasonable time, he could bring an action challenging his continued confinement. However, the court refused to prescribe what that treatment should
consist of and held only that appropriate treatment should be determined by
52
competent doctors in their best judgment.
Unfortunately, this case-by-case development of the right to treatment has
proved unsatisfactory in obtaining meaningful reform. The process is expensive, time consuming, and provides relief to only one individual per
case. 53 In this context the recent decision of Wyatt v. Stickney" presents the
possibility of overcoming these difficulties. In Wyatt a class action was filed
by several patients of a state mental institution alleging that they were
receiving inadequate treatment. The court held that patients committed
through civil procedures have a constitutional right to receive adequate and
effective treatment. 55 Wyatt was the first decision in which the adequacy of
treatment issue was successfully raised on behalf of all patients in an institution.56 Because the institution was undergoing a reorganization at the time
evidence was presented in Wyatt, the court reserved judgment on the ques57
tion of whether the patients were in fact receiving inadequate treatment.
The court did find, however, that the programs of treatment in effect prior
to the reorganization were scientifically and medically inadequate in that
they "failed to conform to any known minimums established for providing
treatment for the mentally ill."511 As a result, the court ordered the state's
mental health board to fully implement within six months a treatment
program that would give the patients a realistic opportunity to be cured or
to improve his or her mental condition. 59 The court cited Rouse in holding

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968).
Id. at 607, 233 N.E.2d at 910.
Id. at 614, 233 N.E.2d at 914.
See Drake, supra note 27, at 595.
325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).

55. Id. at 784.
56. Drake, supra note 27, at 596.

57. 325 F. Supp. at 785.
58. Id. at 784.
59. At the expiration of the six-month period the court heard evidence on the
status of the treatment programs it had previously ordered to be implemented. Wyatt v.
Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971). The court stated there are three fundamental

conditions for adequate and effective treatment programs in public mental institutions: a
humane psychological and physical environment, qualified staff in numbers sufficient to
administer adequate treatment, and individualized treatment plans. The court found the

institution was still deficient in all three areas but because the defendants since the earlier
hearing had generally demonstrated good faith and a desire to obtain minimum medical

and constitutional standards for the institution, the court deferred turning over the
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that the "failure to provide suitable and adequate treatment to the mentally
' 60
ill cannot be justified by lack of staff or facilities."
6
It is noteworthy that Florida's statute, unlike the Draft Act, 62 does not
qualify the right to treatment to the extent that facilities, equipment, and personnel are available. As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals said of the
right to treatment provided by Maryland's defective delinquent statute,
"[dleficiencies in staff, facilities, and finances would undermine . . . the
justification for the law, and ultimately the constitutionality of its application." 6s
Once the court has found a mental patient to have been deprived of his
statutory or constitutional right to treatment, it must fashion an appropriate
remedy. Outright release through habeas corpus may be undesirable if the
patient would present a danger to himself or to society.6 4 As indicated in
Rouse, however, dispositions other than the patient's unconditional release
are appropriate. 65 The court may allow the incarcerating institution a reasonable opportunity to initiate treatment, but if the opportunity for treatment
has been exhausted or is otherwise inappropriate, the patient's unconditional
or conditional release may be in order. 66 In Lake v. Cameron6 7 the court
established a principle of the "least restrictive alternative" for the patient
denied adequate treatment. In reviewing a civilly committed patient's petition for habeas corpus, the court should satisfy itself that no less onerous

operation of the hospital to a panel of masters. Instead, the court set a future hearing
for the purpose of allowing the parties to present proposed standards and evidence in
support thereof from which the court would establish standards and in due course order
their implementation. Id. at 1343-44. These standards were subsequently established. See
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Comment, Constitutional Law:
Mental Patients and Court Ordered Standards of Treatment, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 614 (1973).
60. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
61. FLA. STAT. §394.459 (2) (1971) provides: "The policy of the state is that the department shall not deny treatment for mental illness to any person, and that no services
shall be delayed at a receiving or treatment facility because of inability to pay."
62. DRAFr Acr, supra note 10, §19 provides: "Every patient shall be entitled to
humane care and treatment and, to the extent that facilities, equipment, and personnel
are available, to medical care and treatment in accordance with the highest standards accepted in medical practice."
63. Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 516-17 (4th Cir. 1964). See Nason v. Superintendent
of Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968).
64. See Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233
N.E.2d 908 (1968): "Obviously Nason cannot be turned loose upon the community in his
present state." Id. at 613, 233 N.E.2d at 913-14.
65. Rouse v. Cameron, 873 F.2d 451, 458-59 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See United States
ex rel. Daniels v. Johnston, 328 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
66. 373 F.2d at 458-59. Judge Bazelon indicated that in determining the extent to
which the hospital would be given an opportunity to develop an adequate treatment program, important considerations include the length of time the patient has lacked adequate treatment, the length of time he has been in custody, the nature of the patient's
mental illness, and the degree of danger resulting from the mental illness that the
patient would present if released. Id. at 458.
67. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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disposition would serve the purpose of commitment, such as out-patient
6
treatment, foster care, half-way houses, day hospitals, or nursing homes. ,
A second remedy available to the patient deprived of his right to treatment is a suit for monetary damages under the Civil Rights Act69 or through
tort action.7- The mental patient in Whitree v. State,73 having been found
incompetent to stand trial, was committed to a state mental hospital where
he received only custodial care. In an action for false imprisonment, the
court found the lack of treatment primarily responsible for the inordinate
length of the plaintiff's incarceration and awarded damages of 300,000
2
dollars.7
Finally, a patient may seek a writ of mandamus compelling officials of
the incarcerating institution to provide the patient with adequate treatment. 73 Relief through this remedy is limited in that the writ will issue to
compel an official to perform a "ministerial" duty but not to control an
official's exercise of discretion. 74 Furthermore, the court is without the power
to compel the legislature to provide the necessary funding.75 In Nason v.
Commissioner of Mental Health76 the plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus
compelling the hospital officials to provide facilities that would insure his
receiving adequate medical treatment. The court concluded that mandamus
was not the proper remedy, since the plaintiff was asking a public official to
make a particular decision on discretionary matters.7 7 Florida's Mental Health
Act appears to favor this form of remedy, however, in that it allows a
county judge to conduct a judicial inquiry and to issue any appropriate
order to correct an abuse of rights afforded the patient under the Act. 78
Florida's "right to treatment" statute offers an excellent opportunity for
providing incarcerated mental patients with a sound and progressive mental

68.

Id. at 659-60. But see State v. Sanchez, 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1969).

69. 42 U.S.C. §§1981-95 (1970). During the printing of this Note, a jury awarded a
judgment of $38,500 to a mental patient who had brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Plaintiff, who had been involuntarily committed, alleged he had been confined against his
will and had received inadequate treatment during his confinement. He had been incarcerated 14 years and had received only 3 examinations during that time. Donaldson v.
O'Connor, Tallahassee Civil Action 1693 (N.D. Fla. 1972).
70. Tort action may prove impractical as a remedy for the patient denied adequate
treatment. Litigation is expensive, time consuming, and may present some formidable
problems of damage computation.
71. 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
72.

See id.

73. See 28 U.S.C. §1361 (1970).
74. W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE, ADMINISrRATIVE LAw 120 (5th ed. 1970). For a discussion
of the difficulties present when a patient attempts to employ any remedy from within the
institutional walls, see Halpern, supra note 46, at 795.
75. See Drake, supra note 27, at 600 n.48. See generally Comment, Enforcement of
Judicial Financing Orders: Constitutional Rights in Search of a Remedy, 59 GEo. L.J. 393

(1970).
76. 351 Mass. 94, 217 N.E.2d 733 (1966).
77. Id. at 96, 217 N.E.2d at 735.
78. FLA. STAT. §394.459 (9) (b) (1971).
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health program. The quality of treatment set by the legislature and reviewed
judicially by the substantial evidence test is sensible because it will allow the
courts to inquire into a particular patient's needs without becoming engulfed
by litigation and without becoming involved in psychiatric decisions beyond
their judicial competence. If the treatment programs of the entire institution
are deficient, which would make case-by-case litigation an ineffective means
of reform, Florida courts should be receptive to class actions as was employed
in Wyatt v. Stickney" The Florida Legislature should now make real its
promise of adequate medical treatment for incarcerated mental patients by
providing adequate funding.
THE RIGHT NOT To BE TREATED

The emergence of the mental patient's right to receive adequate medical
treatment while incarcerated has caused greater emphasis to be placed on
the problem of how far hospital officials may go in administering treatments,
especially those that are potentially dangerous to the patient1 0 In the nonmental hospital the legal rules relating to such treatment are well settled81
Except in emergency situations, the physician may not operate without consent. 2 In the event that the patient is known to be incapable of granting
consent because of a disability such as infancy or intoxication, the required
consent must be obtained from the proper relative or guardian.8 3 An unauthorized operation renders the physician liable for damages.8 4 The administration of this rule presents few difficulties as the patient, or in the case
of a minor, a parent, is almost always willing to consent.8 5
The mental institution and its patients, however, present characteristics
unlike those of the medical hospital. Since the courts might find that a
patient is mentally incapable of giving consent, hospital officials must proceed
on the assumption that the patient's acquiescence is legally ineffectives8
Many incarcerated patients are public charges who do not have guardians
that could provide the necessary consent.8 7 Other patients become estranged
from their families or become institutionalized at some distance from their
home community.88 Even if the patient is legally competent, he may feel
pressured to give his consent, since his release and other personal liberties are

79. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; FLA. R. Cirv. P. 1.220.
80. For a discussion of the various treatments, their general uses, and effects, see Note,
Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?." "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 616 (1972).
81. W. PROSSm, LAW OF TORTS §18 (3d ed. 1964).
82. Id. at 102-04.
83. Id. at 104.
84. Id. at 105.
85.

Ross, supra note 3, at 1003. See also Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to

Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628 (1969).
86. Ross, supra note 3, at 1003-04.
87.
88.

See Hearings,supra note 1, at 340.
Ross, supra note 3, at 1004.
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determined to a large extent by the hospital officials seeking consent8 9 All
these factors place hospital administrators in a dilemma if they wish to treat
the patient, especially if the treatment poses some danger to the patient.
As a result, most hospital officials take the position that the legal rules
governing treatment in the medical hospital are inapplicable to patients
incarcerated in state mental institutions under the doctrine of parens
patriae.90 The crux of the argument is that mentally ill persons are considered
wards of the state, and thus the state as parens patriae must provide the
necessary care and treatment. 91 The primary consideration in the performance
of this governmental function "is the patient's welfare, not what the patient
or his relatives believe to be in his interest."

2

Only a few states have dealt with this problem through legislation.
Generally such statutes pertain only to surgery and require consent of the
patient, or a relative, or guardian if the patient is legally incompetent, in a
non-emergency situation. 93 California takes a unique approach by exempting
patients from both medical and psychiatric treatment if the patient files a
statement that he depends upon prayer or spiritual means for healing.9 4
Specific regulation of potentially dangerous therapies such as electro-shock
and drug treatment has received even less attention from the states. 95 California allows the patient to refuse lobotomy and shock treatment. 9 Several
attorneys' general opinions have taken the view that state hospital officials,
under the doctrine of parens patriae and on the basis of the state's police
power, are entitled to administer those treatments, including such therapies
as electro-shock and lobotomy, as are deemed proper for the patient's medical
welfare without the requirement of consent. 97
There are few legal precedents dealing with the question of whether
incarcerated mental patients have the right to refuse treatment. In Whitree v.
State,98 discussed previously, the court implies that mental patients do not
possess such a right, and the hospital must provide treatment to the patient
even if he will not consent to treatment. In Whitree the court awarded damages because the patient had been incarcerated in a state institution without
adequate treatment. The evidence indicated that Whitree was not treated
with any of the modern tranquilizing drugs or any of their less effective

89. F.
90.

LNDMAN & D. McINTYRF. supranote 8, at 161.
See Hearings,supra note 1, at 340.

91. Ross, supra note 3, at 1004.

92. Id.
93. See, e.g., MINN.
94.

STAT. ANN. §253A.17 (8) (1971).
CAL. WEIT. & INSr'NS CODE §7104 (West 1972);

see

text accompanying notes

101-105

infra.
95. See F. LiNmsAN & D. McINTY'a, supra note 8, at 182-83.
96. CAL. WEIT. & INSr'NS CODE §5325 (f), (g) (West 1972).
97. See 1948 PA. Op. ATr'Y GEN. 120; 1948 Wis. Op. ATr'y GEN. 502. But see F. Miutm,
R. DAWSON, G. Dix & R. PARNAS, CIUMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION AND REIATED PROCESSES
1668-69 (1971). See generally Morris, "Criminality" and the Right to Treatment, 36 U.
Cu. L. REv.784 (1969).
98. 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. C1. 1968).
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antecedents during his entire stay at the hospital because he refused them. 99
The court considered this reason to be "illogical, unprofessional and not
consonant with prevailing medical standards." 10 0
In the recent case of Winters v. Miller,101 however, the court held that a
legally competent patient does enjoy the privilege of refusing treatment if
that refusal is based on religious beliefs. There, plaintiff sought damages
under the Civil Rights Act 02 from hospital officials who forced her to accept
medication after her involuntary commitment. Plaintiff was a Christian
Scientist and claimed that the forced treatment was against her religious
beliefs and thus violated her constitutional right to freedom of religion. In
holding that the plaintiff's claim stated a cause of action, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the state's assertion of an "overriding
secular interest of public health and welfare" in the care and treatment of
persons suffering from mental illness.10 3 There was no evidence to indicate
that compulsory medication was in any way protecting the interest of society
or even any third party. Because the plaintiff had not as yet been declared
legally incompetent, the court also rejected the state's contention that it was
acting as parens patriae and therefore had the responsibility as well as the
04
right to decide what was best for the patient under the circumstances.
The court acknowledged, however, that the state could undertake to treat
the patient if it did stand in a parens patriae relationship but there could be
no such relationship in the absence of a judicial determination of legal
incompetency.05
Florida's Mental Health Act is devoid of provisions governing the
problem of consent or the regulation of potentially dangerous treatment. In
order to avoid the constitutional issue presented in Winters, Florida should
allow any legally competent patient to refuse treatment if such refusal is
founded on true religious convictions.00 Since commitment in Florida is a
proceeding distinct from a judicial determination of incompetency, 07 it is
probable that there are incarcerated patients in state institutions who are
legally competent and hold religious reservations to certain types of treat-

99. Id. at 699, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
100. Id.; cf. Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Mo. 1968), where the court denied
a writ of habeas corpus brought by a federal prisoner who claimed he was being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because of the forced injection of tranquilizing
drugs.
101. 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
102. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970), which provides: "Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proceedings for redress."
103. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1971).
104. Id. at 70-71.
105. Id. at 71. But see In re Brook's Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
106.

See, e.g., CAL.

107. See FLA.

STAT.

WELF.

& INsr'NS CODE §7104 (WEsr 1972).

§§394.463, .465, .467, 744.31 (1971).
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ment. Judicial and legislative action in this area will prevent placing hospital
administrators in the dilemma of providing the patient's constitutional and
statutory right to treatment while still respecting the patient's constitutional
right to freedom of religion. Otherwise, the patient with religious convictions
that proscribe treatment might be able to sue for violation of his first
amendment rights while still maintaining the right to sue for non-treatment.
For the mentally ill falling within the ambit of the parens patriae relationship, the legislature should enact guidelines that would protect the
patient's right to receive adequate treatment without subjecting him to potentially dangerous treatment in the absence of consent. One commentator has
suggested that routine medical attention and therapies that are recognized
as medically safe be left to the discretion of hospital physicians while more
extensive and potentially dangerous treatments be made subject to the consent of either the patient's guardian, attorney, or a legal-medical board
established for the purpose of reviewing the advisability of certain forms of
treatment.0 s This approach has been adopted to a limited extent through
09
Rule
a recent amendment to Florida's Rules of Criminal Procedure.
3.210 (a), which became effective February 1, 1973, provides that in the event
an accused in a criminal proceeding is found mentally incompetent to stand
trial, he shall be committed to a mental institution under the provisions of
the state's involuntary civil commitment statute. The defendant's attorney
shall be designated as his representative and as such is authorized to consent
on behalf of the defendant to necessary surgical or medical treatment and
procedures.
While the underlying purpose of the rule is commendable, several deficiencies exist. First, the attorney is infrequently confronted with problems
in the mental health area. Unlike a medical-legal review board, which would
have its own source of expertise, the attorney must seek out the psychiatric
knowledge required to render an intelligent decision on behalf of his client.
Since most criminal defendants are represented by the public defender, it is
probable that much of this responsibility will fall on that already understaffed office. Second, the rule authorizes the attorney to provide consent on
behalf of his client even though the defendant may not have been declared
legally incompetent. If the rationale of Winters is followed, there is a question of whether the state can stand as parenspatriae in relation to a mentally
ill person in the absence of a judicial determination of legal incompetency.
Third, the rule applies only to those committed patients who were initially
involved in the criminal process. This piecemeal approach should be replaced
by a comprehensive statute governing the problem of consent for all incarcerated patients.
The legal task of protecting the patient from dangerous treatments while
still allowing hospital officials the discretion needed to properly fulfill the

108. Note, Compulsory Commitment: The Rights of the Incarcerated Mentally Ill, 1969
DuiuE L.J. 677, 713. Cf. Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 656, 464 P.2d 56, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 600 (1970).
109. FLA. R. CQim. P. 3.210.
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patient's right to treatment presents a formidable task. Nevertheless, any
legislation in this area should insure that all treatment programs are properly
supervised and regulated so as to prevent their possible abuse by hospital
personnel. 1 0
Although improvements in treatment have diminished their use, mechanical restraints continue to play a major role in the treatment programs of
some institutions."" A majority of states,"12 including Florida,"x3 have statutory enactments regulating the use of restraints. Florida's provision is woefully
inadequate in merely calling for the non-use of restraints except for the protection of the patient or others. The statute fails to specify who is to make
such a determination or even that the use of restraints be noted in the
patient's clinical record. Because there is evidence to indicate that ward
attendants employ mechanical restraints as a tool for imposing discipline and
punishment,"14 an inclusive and comprehensive statute is needed. Florida
should attempt to insure that restraints are used only for medical necessity
by requiring that a hospital physician authorize their use and that the reason
for restraint, the person ordering its use, and the length of time the restraint
was employed be entered on the patient's clinical record."5r Furthermore,
the statute should require that in the event restraint is needed, no greater
amount of restraint be used than is absolutely necessary under the circumstances. Finally, criminal penalties for the wrongful application of mechanical restraints should be provided.:""

110. Such regulation is particularly needed in the use of electro-shock treatments,
which are an extensively used therapy, the merits of which have provoked a great deal of
controversy. Critics of this therapy contend that despite its widespread use it has no
beneficial results. Some patients break bones during the therapy convulsions and still
others die. These "convulsions often resemble those of an accident victim in death agony
and are accompanied by choking gasps and at times by a foaming overflow of saliva from
the mouth." The patient usually loses consciousness and does not remember the treatment.
Opponents also charge that the therapy is used as a disciplinary tool. Threats of electroshock therapy are made by ward attendants in order to maintain peace and quiet in the
ward or to control certain patients whose behavior does not satisfy the attendant. F. LINDMAN & D. McINTYRE, supra note 8, at 163. See I. BELKNAP, HUMAN PROBLEMS OF A STATE
MENTAL HOSPITAL 191-95 (1956).
111. F. LINDMAN & D. MCINTYRE, supra note 8, at 159.
112. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §66-345 (Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. §253A.17 (1971);
UTAH CODE ANN. §64-7-47 (1968).
118. -FLA. STAT. §394.459 (1) (1971).
114. See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 319 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Ct. Cl. 1970), where the court, in
awarding $15,000 damages, described the misuse of restraints as incredible. See generally
A. DEuTscH, TnE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERIcA ch. 11 (1946).
115. See, e.g., DaRFr Aar, supra note 10, §20.
116. Another consideration that merits legislative attention in Florida is the control
of tranquilizing drugs, which have gained in popularity in recent years as a substitute for
use of mechanical restraints. The use of these drugs should be subject to the same requirements as those proposed for mechanical restraints. See F. Lo.mAN & D. MclsRrE,
supra note 8, at 160-61.
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THE RIGHT To COMMUNICATE
The right of the incarcerated mentally ill to communicate was the first
right to receive judicial and legislative recognition and is the only right that
has received statutory sanctions in most states. 17 Sufficient justification for
the enumeration of such a right is that the mental patient is not a criminal
and should not be treated as one." 8s In addition, permitting the incarcerated
mental patient freedom to communicate is desirable for practical reasons.
For instance, "loss of liberty harms the mental patient and is unnecessary
for the public safety."" 19 It has been demonstrated that freedom is a thera20
peutic tool, that it speeds recovery and is therefore conducive to economy.
Since denial of a patient's right to communicate with counsel may impinge
upon his ability to petition for release, treatment, or enforcement of other
rights, it is generally agreed that this communication should remain unrestricted.' 21 Controversy exists, however, with respect to other communications and consequently the various state enactments vary considerably in
their guarantees. Some provide for the censorship of all mail that contains
threatening or offensive material. 22 Others authorize the patient to designate
a correspondent outside of the institution and require that mail be forwarded
to that designee without examination.123 Many states follow the Draft Act' 24

and provide for uncensored correspondence to and from a selected class of
persons or public officials.325 Several states require that the institution supply
the patient with writing materials and postage. 26 That guarantee, which
may appear to be superfluous, is nevertheless extremely beneficial in regard
to the patient's ability to correspond with persons outside the institution. 27
2
States having statutes governing visitation generally follow the Draft Act 8
and delegate to the institution broad powers to control visitation.129

117. Ross, supra note 3,at 995; Note, supra note 108, at 703.
118. T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 39 (1963).

119.
120.
121.
L. Riv.
122.

Hearings,supra note 1, at 45.
Id.
See Note, District of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, 65 COLUM.
1062, 1073 (1965).
See, e.g., NEB.

REv. STAT.

§83-314

(1966).

The arguments offered

in

favor of

complete censorship of outgoing mail is that mentally ill patients are apt to express hostility toward certain persons outside the institution and their letters may contain threatening or offensive material. It has also been noted that some patients write of the "horrors"
of their confinement, which results in the initiation of discharge proceedings by relatives
without a factual basis. F. LINDMAN & D. McINTYRE, supra note 8, at 157.
123. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §255A.17 (3)(1971).
124. DsuFr AcT, supra note 10, §21.
125. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §59-2929 (Supp. 1968).
126. See, e.g., CAL. WELtx. & INsr'NS CODE §5325 (West 1972).

127. Comment, The Committed Mentally Ill and Their Right To Communicate, 7
WAKE FoRESt L. REv. 297, 301 (1971).
128. DRAiFT ACT,supra note 10, §21.
129. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §66-346 (Supp. 1970). Since most mental institutions
are located in remote areas of the state, visitation cannot be considered as a realistic
alternative in allowing the patient to communicate freely with persons outside the in-
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The better reasoned statute governing the communication of incarcerated
mental patients appears to be that enacted by Congress in 1966 for the District
of Columbia. 130 The D. C. Act allows the patient more freedom of communication by making no provision for the censorship of outgoing mail.131
Incoming correspondence, however, other than letters from the patient's
attorney or physician, may be censored for the medical welfare of the
patient.132 Thus, the patient is insured of an absolute right to communicate
with the two people most likely to assist in his release and treatment. Additionally, the D. C. Act deters any violation of this right by providing substantial criminal penalties for whomever causes the denial of rights afforded
33
the patient under the Act..

The need for an absolute right of communication between patient and
attorney as provided by the D. C. Act is evidenced by the court's decision in
Hanson v. Biddle.13 There, a state statute provided that the patient should
have all reasonable opportunities for communicating with his or her friends.
An attorney sought a writ of mandamus to compel the hospital to allow
communication between himself and those patients whom he believed were
seeking release on the grounds that they were no longer insane. The court
denied the writ on the theory that the attorney was not a friend as contemplated by the statute. The opinion noted that "small room should be allowed
for the intervention of individuals to whom patients may smuggle communications stating that they are of sound mind, and want to be released,
1 35
and who are therefor intruders and disturbers."'
Subsequent decisions adjudicating the right of the incarcerated patient
to communicate with an attorney have rejected such reasoning. In In re
Weightman's Estate"36 the court held that the patient was entitled to communicate with and be represented by counsel in a habeas corpus proceeding,
notwithstanding the fact that leave to proceed was not initially obtained from
the court that had appointed the guardian of the incompetent's estate. In
addition, two New York cases allowed unhindered communication between
patient and counsel on the basis of the patient's constitutional right to
petition for habeas corpus. In Hoff v. State 3"7 the court ruled that an action
of malfeasance against the state was proper when the superintendent of a
state mental institution gave letters written by the patient, addressed to his

stitution. In Florida, for example, state mental institutions are located at Chattahoochee,
Arcadia, Macclenny, and Hollywood. FLA. STAT. §394.457 (8) (1971).
130. D.C. CODE ANN. §21-561 (1967).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. §591. Only a minority of states provide criminal penalties for denial of the
patient's statutory right to communicate. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §66-346 (Supp. 1970);
NEV. REv. STAT. §533.719 (1968).
134. 84 Kan. 877, 115 P. 639 (1911).
135. Id. at 878, 115 P. at 639-40.
136. 126 Pa. Super. 221, 190 A. 552 (1937).
137. 279 N.Y. 490, 18 N.E.2d, 671 (1939). See also In re Hoffmen, 131 Cal. App. 2d. 758,
281 P.2d 96 (1955).
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attorney, to the patient's wife. The court reasoned that the failure to forward
the patient's letters, which were subsequently suppressed by the wife, constituted an unreasonable restraint on the patient's right to a writ of habeas
corpus. 138 Again in People ex rel Jacobs v. Worthing'3 9 the court held that
a hospital regulation ordering that mail of patients be disposed of according
to the written direction of the guardian, or a special hospital committee,
constituted an unreasonable restraint on the patient to petition for habeas
corpus by preventing communications between patient and attorney. Although New York patients at that time did not have an absolute right to
communicate with counsel, they did have such a right with respect to certain
public officials.1 40 The court in Jacobs explained that these exceptions were
too restrictive because public officials may be unable or unwilling to act and,
therefore, the patient's attorney should be included.14' New York has since
changed its regulation to allow patients the right to unobstructed correspond42
ence with attorneys.
Moreover, New York has established a Mental Health Information
Service 43 that serves as a safeguard of all patient rights, including the right
of the patient to communicate with counsel.'" The Service consists of court
attached personnel who contact each patient and inform him of his rights
in addition to other functions such as conducting investigations and submitting their findings to the court in the event of a judicial hearing. 45 The
importance of such a service to the indigent patient with no family is obvious.
Most states fail to impose criminal sanctions on the person responsible
for obstructing the patient's right to communicate, and the statutes make
no endeavor to compensate the patient for denial of that right. 4 Such is the
case in Florida, which specifically grants immunity from both civil and criminal liability to those who violate the rights of patients if acting in "good
faith."' 47 Absent a statutory remedy, the patient must rely on common law
actions with only sparse case law on point. Nevertheless, some actions have
been successful. For instance, in Hoff v. State 48 the court allowed an action
for malfeasance when hospital officials suppressed the patient's correspondence
49
addressed to his attorney. Again in Stowers v. Ardmore Acres Hospital'
plaintiff, pursuant to a court order, was taken to a private hospital where

138. 279 N.Y. at 493, 18 N.E.2d at 672.
139. 167 Misc. 702, 4 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1938).
140. Id. at 705, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
141. Id., 4 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
142. N.Y. Codes, Rules and Regs. (4th Supp. 1949), Dep't of Mental Hygiene General
Order No. 11 (e).
143. N.Y. MENTAL HYGMNE LAW §88 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
144. F. LINDMAN &D. McINTYRE, supra note 8, at 156.
146. Id. For a full discussion of the service, see Note, The New York Mental Health
Information Service: A New Approach to Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 67 COLUm.
L. REv. 672 (1967).
146. See Comment, supra note 127, at 303.
147. FLA. STAT. §394.459 (12) (1971).
148. 279 N.Y. 490, 18 N.E.2d 671 (1939).
149. 19 Mich. App. 115, 172 N.W.2d 497 (1969).
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she was denied communication with anyone for six days other than seeing
her husband and children. The husband had favored plaintiff's commitment.
Plaintiff was given drugs by the defendant in violation of a state statute prohibiting such treatment at a private hospital.'" In an action for false imprisonment and assault and battery, the hospital argued that the procedure
was proper as being pursuant to a court order of hospitalization. The court,
however, concluded that such detention and seclusion went beyond that contemplated by the court order and awarded damages of 40,000 dollars. 151
Because it was based on extensive investigation the D. C. Act 52 represents
an excellent model for the states. Florida, however, chose not to follow the
Act and instead enacted its own provisions governing the right of incarcerated mental patients to communicate.153 The Florida statute creates a qualified
privilege of communication with wide discretionary powers being delegated
to the hospital administrator. Both incoming and outgoing correspondence
may be censored if there is reason to believe that such communication is
likely to be harmful to the patient or others or if it is believed that such
correspondence contains items or substances that may be harmful to the
patient or others..5 4 Any restrictions on the patient's right to communicate
must be served on the patient and his guardian and recorded on the patient's
clinical record with the reasons therefor. 15 5 Because the Florida statute makes
censorship of the patient's communications a discretionary function of the
hospital administrator, it fails to protect the patient from possible abuses of
his statutory right to communicate freely with persons outside the institution.
The understaffing of hospital personnel makes it probable that decisions on
restricting a patient's communications will be delegated to subordinates such
as the non-medical ward attendant.' 56 Determinations of what civil restrictions are necessary for the patient's medical welfare obviously should not be
made by a ward attendant.157 The statute attempts to correct this deficiency
by requiring the administrator to review each patient's restriction of communication at least every ninety days but the same delegation problem exists
in the performance of this directive. 5 8
The Florida statute presently governing the mental patient's right to
communicate should be repealed and a proper statutory vehicle designed to
protect that right should be enacted. There are no persuasive arguments for
limiting the patient's right to communicate with those persons who might
help improve his situation. At a minimum, the incarcerated patient should
enjoy the absolute right to communicate with his attorney, physician, guardian or personal representative, public officials, the committing court, and the

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 117, 172 N.W.2d at 500-01.
Id. at 118, 172 N.W.2d at 502.
D.C. CODE §21-561 (1967).
FLA. STAT. §394.459 (4) (1971).
Id.
Id.
See F. LINDMAN & D. MCINTYRE, supra note 8, at 157.
Id.
FLA. STAT. §394.459 (4) (1971).
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hospital's central administration. This right should be effectuated by providing criminal penalties and civil liability along with procedures for enforcement. 59° To insure that the right to correspond is a realistic one, the institution should be required to furnish each patient with appropriate writing
materials and postage. 6 0 Communications other than those described above
could then be made subject to censorship if in the medical interest of the
patient or others. Such a system would prevent any possible abuse by hospital
personnel from interfering with the patient's ability to seek his release or
enforcement of his statutory and constitutional rights.
While the growing national trend is to afford the incarcerated mental
patient more ability to communicate freely,""' the Florida statute represents
a regrettable step in the opposite direction. It actually offers less protection
to the patient than the statute it replaced. 6 2 Enactment of the suggested
guarantees would align Florida with those enlightened jurisdictions affording
basic human rights to incarcerated mental patients.
In theory the patient's right to unrestricted communication is a part of
his general civil rights, but usually it has been treated separately from those
statutes governing the patient's retention of his civil rights during incarceration. 6 3 The traditional notion that commitment equates with incompetency
has generally been abrogated in recently enacted mental health codes by
distinguishing incarceration from a judicial determination of incompetency
and by providing separate proceedings for each.16 The reasoning of the Draft
Act was that a patient who needs hospitalization is not necessarily legally
incompetent, and a person who is legally incompetent does not necessarily
require hospitalization 65 Florida's Mental Health Act takes this approach
by specifically separating the two proceedings 6 6 and providing that incarcer-

159. The creation of a program similar to that of New York's Mental Health Information Service represents one method. Such a service could provide regular inspections of each
patient's clinical record in order to detect denial of rights afforded the patient. Legal advice concerning the patient and his statutory and constitutional rights could be rendered.
The presence of the service alone would help deter abuses by the institution. See Hearings,
supra note I, at 330-45.
160. Institutions were required to furnish writing materials by FLA. STAT. §394.14
(1971), which was repealed with the enactment of the Florida Mental Health Act.
161. See, e.g., D.C. CoDa §21-561 (1967).
162. FLA. STAT. §394.13 (1971), which was repealed, entitled the patient to absolute
correspondence with one individual, designated by the patient.
163. Ross, supra note 3, at 995.
164. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §253A.18 (1971).
165. Ross, supra note 3, at 990. See DRArut ACr, supra note 10, §21 commentary. But
note the following remark: "If they aren't competent to look after themselves outside the
hospital, they are not competent to transact business. The idea that a person is allowed
to sell real estate while he is deprived of the right to walk the streets, I find difficult to
comprehend." AaRmcm PSYCHIATRc ASSOCIATION, BinrER CARE IN MENTAL HosprrA.s 43
(Blain ed. 1949).
166. FLA. STAT. §394.467 (1971) (involuntary hospitalization); FLA. STAT. §744.31 (1971)
(incompetency proceedings). At the hearing for involuntary commitment the judge may
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ated patients shall not be deprived of their rights in the absence of an
adjudication of incompetency pursuant to a separate statutory proceeding. 167
Thus, it would appear that incarcerated mental patients in Florida who
have not been adjudicated legally incompetent are entitled to manage their
own affairs such as effectuating contracts, wills, transfers of property, and
similar matters. Indeed, the Florida Act specifically directs that the institution
enable patients, eligible to vote, to obtain voter registration forms and
absentee ballots. 16 The ability of the committed patient to legally manage
his own affairs underscores the need for reforming Florida's statute governing the right of incarcerated patients to communicate.169
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

It has been observed that so long as "mental illness carries with it a stigma
which does not attach to other forms of disease, patients should receive legis'17 0
lative protection against possible social disgrace resulting from publicity."
In relation to the incarcerated mentally ill, there are two distinct aspects to
be considered: privacy of the patient's clinical record and privacy of the
patient's person. Protection of the clinical record has been accorded statutory
recognition in several jurisdictions,"'7 including Florida.1 7 2 In the absence
of legislation this record is still generally kept confidential in accordance with
medical ethics.'

3

Confidentiality of the clinical record not only protects the

patient from adverse publicity, but also protects those persons involved in
4
the commitment process from the patient7
The privacy of one's person while incarcerated has yet to receive statutory
recognition from the states.Y The need for focusing legislative attention
toward the definition of a personal right to privacy for institutionalized
mental patients is evidenced by a film entitled "Titicut Follies," produced
at the Massachusetts Correctional Institute at Bridgewater. Officials of the
Institute allowed the documentary to be filmed which was to portray the
care and treatment of committed mental patients. 1'" The final version pic-

also adjudicate a person incompetent pursuant to the statutory requirements of the incompetency statute. FLA. STAT. §394.467 (3) (1971) (emphasis added).
167. FLA. STAT. §394A59 (1) (1971).
168. FLA. STAT. §394.459 (6) (1971).
169. See text accompanying notes 153-162 supra.
170. Ross, supra note 3, at 998. See Hearings,supra note 1, at 343.
171. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , §12-3 (Supp. 1969).
172. FLA. STAT. §394.459 (8) (1971).
173. Ross, supra note 3, at 999.
174. Id. In two Wisconsin cases, released mental patients assaulted those persons who
had petitioned for their commitment. In both instances it was discovered that the patients
had been in institutions where trusted patients assisted hospital personnel in administrative
duties whereby they had access to patient records. By this means, the patients were able
to ascertain the names of those persons who had petitioned for their commitment. Id.
175. Note, Compulsory Commitment: The Rights of the Incarcerated Mentally Ill, 1969
DUKE L.J. 677, 706.

176. See Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610, cert. denied, 398
US. 960 (1969).
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tured patients experiencing painful aspects of mental disease as well as nude
patients in the most personal and private situations.1 7 In Cullen v. Grove
Press, Inc."8 four correctional officers who were shown in the film subjecting

naked inmates to a "skin search" sued to enjoin the showing of the film on
grounds of defamation and invasion of privacy.' 9 Because of the legitimate
public interest in state institutions for the criminally insane and in view of
the fact that "expression by means of motion pictures is included within
the free speech and press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,"
the court held that injunctive relief could not be granted unless the picture
was a "false report of conditions at Bridgewater, made with knowledge of
its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth."'80 The court pointed out,
however, that its decision did not constitute an adjudication of the rights of
individual patients claiming violation of their own personal rights.381
Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Wiseman,1 2 the state of Massachusetts, on behalf of the individual patients, brought suit to enjoin all showings
of the film. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted relief as to
showings to the general public on a commercial basis but permitted showings
to audiences of a specialized or a professional character having a serious interest
in rehabilitationJ8 3 The court noted that the Commonwealth under the doctrine of parens patriae had the standing and the duty to protect the patients
from any invasion of their privacy substantially greater than those arising
8
from the very fact of confinement. 1
Despite a movement in constitutional law favoring an all-embracing
interpretation of free speech and press guarantees, 185 the first amendment is
not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. 8 6 The decision in
Wiseman represents a growing realization by the judiciary that the first
amendment "must be tempered by an observance of rights of others and the

177. The trial court in Wiseman found the following: The film "is a hodge-podge of
sequences . . . depicting mentally ill patients engaged in repetitive, incoherent, and obscene
rantings . . . . The film is excessively preoccupied with nudity.... [N]aked inmates are
shown desperately attempting to hide . . . their privates with their hands. There is a
scene of . . . [a priest] administering the last rites of the church to a dying patient [and]
A . . . patient, grossly deformed by . . . conthe preparation of a corpse for burial ....
gential brain damage, is paraded before the camera." 356 Mass. at 254 n.2, 249 N.E.2d at
613 n.2.
178. 276 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
179. Id. at 728.
180. Id. at 729.
181. Id. at 731.
182. 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E2d 610, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1969).
183. Id. at 262, 249 N.E.2d at 618.
184. Id. at 258, 249 N.E2d at 615.
185. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
186. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Ginsberg
v, New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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reasonable requirements of society."'18' Although the courts may be compelled
to balance the rights and privileges when the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and press clash with the right of privacy, there is no basis
for giving either greater weight or higher priority than the other.18s The
courts must strive to insure the goals of each with a minimum of intrusion
upon the other.8 9
The United States Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill'" considered
some of the balancing problems with respect to one form of invasion of
privacy, that of placing an individual in a false light in the public eye. The
statute construed in Time did not create a cause of action for the truthful
publication of newsworthy people or events. 19 1 The Court observed, however,
that this limitation to newsworthy persons and events does not foreclose an
interpretation to allow damages where "[r]evelations may be so intimate and
so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's
notions of decency."' 92 While it would appear that mental patients do enjoy
19 3
a privilege against gross intrusions into their privacy during incarceration,
the problem remains of statutorily defining such a right.- 4
Florida's Mental Health Act, although not specifically providing a personal right to privacy, does specify that the mental patient is entitled to his
individual dignity at all times and on all occasions. 195 Arguably, this directive could be interpreted to proscribe any publicity that would be embarrassing to the patient, such as being exhibited while nude or experiencing

187. Note, supra note 175, at 708. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HAsV. L. REv. 193 (1890). The "[a]cceptance of the right to privacy has grown with the
increasing capability of the mass media and electronic devices with their capacity to
destroy an individual's anonymity, intrude upon his most intimate activities, and expose
his most personal characteristics to public gaze." Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4
Cal. 3d 529, 533, 483 P.2d 34, 37, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 869 (1971).
188. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925, 929 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 449 F.2d
245 (9th Cir. 1971).
189. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 541, 483 P.2d 34, 42, 93
Cal. Rptr. 866, 874 (1971).
190. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
191. Id. at 382.
192. Id. at 383 n.7.
193. In Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942), the Supreme
Court of Missouri suggested that the element of illness warrants some measure of privilege
that would proscribe undesired publicity. "Certainly if there is any right of privacy at all,
it should include the right to obtain medical treatment at home or in a hospital for an
individual personal condition . . . without personal publicity." Id. at 1207, 159 S.W.2d at
295.
194. Note, supra note 175, at 708. See Nimmer, The Right To Speak from Times to
Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L.
Rtv. 935 (1968). Professor Nimmer contends that the public disclosure of facts, which but
for the defendant's disclosure would not have been known to the public, which is embarrassing but not defamatory, should be without first amendment protection. Id. at 959-60.
He points out that invasions of privacy, unlike defamation, cannot be rehabilitated by
further speech that establishes the truth. Id. at 961.
195. FLA. STAT. §394.459(1) (1971).
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painful aspects of mental disease. A contrary interpretation would be inconsistent with the underlying social justification for incarcerating the mentally
ill.
THE RIGHT

To

CHALLENGE AD

INISTRATIVE DECISIONS

In addition to the specific rights discussed above, several decisions have
indicated that any internal administrative decision that affects the patient's
liberty is subject to judicial review. 196 Generally, this situation presents
itself when hospital officials attempt to transfer the patient to a different
ward or facility where there exists substantial differences in the conditions of
confinement.197 Since treatment is an essential purpose justifying involuntary
commitment, 19 a decision to confine a patient under maximal restrictions
cannot be made without consideration of its therapeutic consequences.1 9
The conditions of confinement may significantly enhance or retard a given
patient's recovery. 00
In Covington v. Harris2°0 the plaintiff had been involuntarily committed
to Saint Elizabeth's Hospital where he was lodged in the John Howard
Pavilion.-2 His supervising physician recommended transfer from this maximum security ward but the transfer was denied by the hospital administrator.2 03 Plaintiff then sought his transfer by petitioning for habeas corpus,
challenging the place as well as the fact of confinement.0 4 The court held
that the standard of judicial review when challenging internal administrative
decisions is limited to a determination of whether the administration has
made a permissible and reasonable decision in view of the relevant information and within a broad range of discretion. 20 5 However, the court indicated
that the principle of "least restrictive alternative" was equally applicable to
alternative dispositions within the hospital, since that range of alternatives

196. See, e.g., Jones v. Robinson, 440 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Williams v. Robinson,
432 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
197. See Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
198. See text accompanying notes 15-79 supra.

199. 419 F.2d at 625.
200. Id.
201. 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
202. In the District of Columbia, Saint Elizabeth's Hospital is the major mental

institution, having approximately 4,000 patients. Of these, approximately 300 are housed
in a separate building known as John Howard Pavilion, which is specifically designated
for patients involved in the criminal process. Golten, Role of Defense Counsel in the
Criminal Commitment Process, 10 AM. Cium. L. REv. 885 n.1 (1972). Assignment to a
ward for the criminally insane entails deprivations of liberty and dignity, which make it
more penitentiary than mental hospital. As compared to a civil ward, treatment facilities
are usually poorer, security more stringent and privileges fewer, and release is more
difficult to obtain. Id. at 418 n.144. See Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 622-23 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
203. 419 F.2d at 619.

204. Id. at 620. See Clatterback v. Harris, 295 F. Supp. 84 (D.C. 1968).
205. 419 F.2d at 621. See Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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is almost as wide as that of dispositions without.20 6 Thus, before the court
would determine if the hospital had made a permissible and reasonable
decision, it had to be able to conclude that the officials considered and found
inadequate all relevant alternative dispositions within the institution.207
The court noted that the hospital's duty to explore intra-hospital alternatives
to maximum security confinement "can hardly be assailed as an intolerable
'
burden on the administrators."208
The rationale of Covington appears equally
applicable to suspensions of work release privileges, leaving the patient in
extended periods of seclusion, and transfers among institutions when there
exists considerable differences in the conditions of confinement between
209
them.
Two recent decisions have dealt with the procedural requirements necessary
to sustain a decision by hospital officials to transfer a patient to the maximum
security ward for allegedly committing criminal offenses. The plaintiff in
Williams v. Robinson 210 was placed in maximum security after an administrative ex parte determination that he had robbed a hospital employee. Plaintiff
denied committing the offense and petitioned for habeas corpus seeking a
transfer out of the maximum security unit. Hospital records disclosed only
reports from the hospital security force detailing investigation of the robbery
and concluding that the plaintiff was the perpetrator.2 11 The court ruled
that this was enough to support an interim decision to transfer the patient
to maximum security but insufficient to support his continued confinement
in the absence of a showing that the plaintiff had been afforded a reasonable
2 12
opportunity to test the evidence against him.
The minimum due process requirements for reaching a final determination of transfer were subsequently laid down in Jones v. Robinson.213 Guidelines included the appointment of a neutral investigating officer who would
interview all witnesses and make a written memorandum of each interview,
copies to be given to the accused.214 Confrontation and cross-examination
of witnesses is allowed so long as hospital officials believe it will not have
an adverse effect on them.2 1 5 While a lawyer for the accused is not necessary,
a lay representative is to be provided if one is warranted. No court reporter
or transcript is required, but a detailed memorandum is to be kept by the
investigating officer who also makes findings and gives reasons for his decision.216 If the officer determines a transfer is required, that judgment, to be

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

419 F.2d at 623-24. See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
419 F.2d at 624.
Id. at 625.
See also United States ex rel. Carroll v. McNeill, 294 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1961).
432 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

211.

Id. at 644.

212.
213.
214.
215.

Id.
440 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id. at 251.
Id. at 252.

216. Id.
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effective, must be affirmed by the hospital superintendent after a review of
217
the record.
The availability of judicial review of internal administrative decisions
affecting the patient's liberty represents a significant safeguard in protecting
all the rights of incarcerated mental patients. Many patients might be reluctant to complain of deprivations of their various rights if there existed a
possibility of reprisal by hospital personnel via an unwarranted transfer to
another ward or facility. In Covington the court noted: "Judicial review is
only a safety catch against the fallibility of the best of men; and not the
least of its services is to spur them to double-check their own performance
and provide them with a checklist by which they may readily do so."218
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The most significant aspect in the development of patient rights is that
of providing treatment. Patients not entitled to receive adequate medical
treatment by virtue of a statutory guarantee are now able to seek such treatment through constitutional mandate. Unfortunately, however, none of the
available remedies can adequately compensate the patient denied his right
to treatment. Only proper legislative funding of treatment programs can
benefit the incarcerated mentally ill and satisfy the social justification underlying involuntary commitment.
There are too few statutes dealing with the control of potentially dangerous therapies and the patient's right to decline treatment. In addition, the
limited amount of case law in this area is unclear. When analyzing this
problem, a combination of three factors must be considered: whether the
patient is merely mentally ill as distinguished from being legally incompetent, whether the patient bases his refusal to be treated on religious grounds
as opposed to a general refusal, and whether the proposed therapy is considered medically safe as compared to potentially dangerous. Additionally, there
remains a question of whether the patient enjoys a constitutional right to
privacy and freedom of the mind that would preclude undesired treatment. 21 9
Although the uncertainty in this area proscribes an opinion on the incarcerated mental patient's ability to refuse treatment, it does point out the
need for definitive legislative and judicial action.
Virtually all the rights accorded mental patients are dependent on the
patient's ability to communicate freely with persons outside the institution.
The general wording of most statutes, including that of Florida, fails to
insure unrestricted communication between the patient and those persons
outside the hospital who may be of assistance to him. The suggested statute
set forth in the Appendix is an attempt to provide the patient with the
uncensored communication necessary to enforce and protect his rights while

217. Id.
218. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 621-22 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
219. For a discussion of the constitutional argument in favor of a "mind privacy"
see Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. Rav. 616, 661-63 (1972).
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still allowing hospital officials the discretion necessary to safeguard the
patient's medical welfare.
The incarcerated patient's right to privacy has been furthered in many
jurisdictions through the statutory protection of the clinical record. Conversely, statutory enactments designed to protect the patient's person while
insitutionalized are virtually non-existent. Applicable case law favors the
patient but should be supplemented by specific legislative guarantees.
Judicial decisions have revealed that administrative decisions that affect
the patient's liberty are subject to judicial review. This availability of scrutiny
by the courts should deter hospital officials from utilizing unwarranted punitive measures designed to discourage the patient from seeking enforcement
of his statutory and constitutional rights.
The remaining obstacle in enforcing Florida's right to treatment statute
is the formulation of a standard of treatment that is feasible for practical
administration by the courts. This should be accomplished through the creation of an administrative agency comprised of legal and medical experts who
would function independently of the hospital administration. The agency
should be empowered to set minimum objective standards for the institution
as a whole, such as patient-staff ratios, professional personnel qualifications,
and the required number of consultations and physical examinations within
a given period of time. This initial formulation of general standards for the
entire institution would be advantageous, since the hospital "cannot provide
adequate treatment for a given patient if it provides no treatment for any
220
patient."
Subjective standards could then be employed by the agency when reviewing complaints of inadequate treatment by individual patients of an institution. By initially having the patient's assertion of lack of treatment reviewed
by an administrative body, many of the burdens of habeas corpus would be
eliminated.221 Because the agency would be comprised of medical and legal
experts and conducted in an informal, non-adversary atmosphere, there
would be no need for the patient to procure psychiatric witnesses and counsel.
To insure that the right to administrative review is a meaningful one, provision should be made for the periodic and automatic review of each patient's
treatment program. Every patient would thus be insured a minimum standard
of treatment regardless of the reason for which he might have failed to raise
the issue himself.222 The patient who disagreed with the findings or rulings
of the agency would then be permitted to seek judicial review under the
traditional standard of the substantial evidence test. This would enable the
courts to assess the adequacy of treatment by a reasonably objective standard
while still requiring that the patient's treatment be suited to his particular

220. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 742, 746
(1969).
221. See Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE
L.J. 87, 115 (1967).
222. See Comment, Involuntary Civil Commitment and the Right to Treatment in
Pennsylvania, 15 Viri. L. REv. 951, 969 (1970).
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needs rather than merely insuring that the institution provides treatment in
general.
The agency would serve the dual purpose of reviewing potentially dangerous therapies proposed for those patients with whom the state stands as
parens patriae.A determination by independent experts not directly involved
with the patient's treatment would best protect the mentally ill patient who
has neither the capacity nor the expertise to make an intelligent decision on
his own behalf. The non-adversary and informal atmosphere of the agency's
proceedings would not require procedures so cumbersome that the institution
would be hesitant to treat patients. This system would be relatively inexpensive and would have the benefit of providing someone who could continually
look after the patient's interests.
Florida's Mental Health Act, although deficient in several areas, nevertheless represents a significant step in the right direction in affording incarcerated mental patients their basic human rights. In order to insure meaningful reform, the legislature must continue to focus on the needs of committed patients, counsel must be as aggressive in protecting their client's
rights after commitment as before, and the judiciary must fashion effective
enforcement. Too long have the incarcerated mentally ill suffered a deprivation of their constitutional rights and human dignity.
PATRICK C. RASTATrER

APPENDIX
SUGGESTED FLORIDA RIGsrT OF COMMUNICATION STATUTE

(a) Each and every patient hospitalized in a facility for the mentally ill in this state,
both public and private, shall be entitled to:
(1). communicate by sealed mail or otherwise, freely without censorship, with any
individual or official agency, inside or outside the facility;
(2). receive unopened correspondence from his or her attorney, physician, personal
representative or guardian, public officials, the court that ordered the patient's hospitalization, and the hospital's central administration; and
(3). have reasonable access to telephones, both to make and receive confidential calls.
(b) AUI incoming mail, other than that referred to in subsection (a) of this section,
may be restricted to the extent that the administrator of the facility determines it necessary
for the medical welfare of the patient. Any such restrictions imposed by the administrator
shall be made a part of the patient's clinical record with the reasons therefor, and written
notice of the restriction shall be served on the patient, his or her attorney, and the
guardian or personal representative of the patient. The restriction of a patient's right to
communicate shall be reviewed by the administrator at least every ninety days. Mail that
is not delivered to the patient for whom it is intended shall be returned to the sender
immediately.
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